To be presented at ISHPSSB, 2025.7.20-25.

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With the development and adoption of computer simulations, evolutionary biologists increasingly rely on how-possibly explanations provided by simulations to understand evolutionary processes. I propose an abductive way of understanding how-possibly explanations from simulations. One way a simulation offers an explanation is by providing a possible causal story, challenging the belief that certain events, causes, or mechanisms are impossible. Another way to understand explanations by simulations is to see it as an abductive inference: if the simulation’s input-output pairs match the observed ones, we may infer that the simulation’s mechanism resembles the real-world process, providing the best explanation for the match.

Presented at APA Central Division Meeting, February 2025.

[Paper]

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I propose a revised definition of etiological proper function, arguing that proper functions should be attributed only to predominant traits — traits with a close-to-one frequency in the population. This restriction preserves the distinction between normal variations and dysfunctions, while better supporting the desired explanatory power and binary attribution of proper functions.

Collaboration with Claudia Gadaleta, Jokubas Janusauskas, Sebastian Sander Oest, and Claudio Davini. Poster presented at PSA 29th Biennial Meeting, 2024.11.14-17.

[Poster] [Model]

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The appearance of multicellular organisms with division of labor among cells marks a major evolutionary milestone. How does the transition from undifferentiated multicellularity to specialization of activities happen? We propose that it can begin with an aggregative phenomenon that occurs when cells share resources and are constrained by lifespan and spatial limits. We use an agent-based model to support this hypothesis: under certain conditions, some simulated cells specialize in one activity throughout their lifespan without genetic changes or selective processes.​

Presented at Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, HKUST, 2024.6.27-29.

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I develop a critique of proper functionalism in epistemology. Specifically, I argue that evolutionary function cannot serve as a necessary condition for warrant, which is the epistemic good that makes a true belief knowledge. This is because cognitive improvements can be accidental, and those accidental cognitive improvements can later be selected and become a proper function. If knowledge is considered to reflect the agent’s ability or effort, a reliable belief produced by an accidental cognitive faculty should still qualify as knowledge, even if it is not a product of proper function.

Presented at Philosophy of Science Around the World, 2023.11.5-17.

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Evolutionary functions are often associated with normativity: they describe how a trait should work. I argue that the normative aspect of evolutionary function is very minimal, if not non-existent at all. This is because evolutionary functions result from the contingent match between certain traits and the environment, either in the past evolutionary history or at present time. Therefore, it is misleading to use evolutionary functions as criteria or explanation for normative judgments, and there is no need to incorporate the normative element into an account of biological function. 

 

Presented at ISHPSSB, 2023.7.9-15.

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I argue that the units of selection question has its explanatory significance, even under the statisticalist view, which posits that models of evolutionary population dynamics explain population change by the appeal to the statistical structure of populations without adverting to the causes of survival and reproduction. The explanatory significance persists because the units of selection concerns the carriers of the trait. Although the carriers of the trait is a causal detail of the phenomena to be explained, it is crucial when applying evolutionary models to specific cases of population changes to offer a statistical explanation.

The statisticalist interpretation of natural selection holds that models of evolutionary population dynamics explain population change by the appeal to the statistical structure of populations, without adverting to the causes of survival and reproduction (Walsh, Ariew & Matthen 2017). Walsh et.al further argues that since the unit of selection question is seeking the unit that selective causes act on, it is merely a bookkeeping problem: which unit is used to count the number is uninteresting and has no explanatory significance (Walsh, Lewens & Ariew 2002, Walsh 2004). I argue that the unit of selection question has its explanatory significance even under the statisticalist view, because it concerns the carrier of the trait. Although the carrier of trait is a causal detail of the phenomena to be explained, it is crucial when applying evolutionary models to specific cases of population changes to offer a statistical explanation.